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Acting
Thursday
August 21, 1952

Staff meeting.

Stanley Andrews came to see me. I am favorably impressed by him and his grasp of the Point IV problems.

Joe Phillips talked to me about matters which will come up at the PSB luncheon today.

Cy Sulzberger called on me to talk particularly about the situation in the Balkans.

After a meeting here with the Near Eastern people, I went over to the White House at 12:30 and delivered Mr. Churchill's letter to the President. He read it and thought it constituted a good basis for an attempt on the part of the U. K. and U. S. Governments to bring the oil dispute in Iran to arbitration. I set up a meeting for later in the afternoon.

We had a PSB lunch today in the Defense Department with Bill Foster as host. Bob Lovett, the Service Secretaries, Alan Kirk, Bedell Smith and Ray Allen were there. The Service Secretaries talked about the paper they had presented calling for greater publicity about new weapons development in the United States. They seemed to feel in varying degree that such publicity would act as a deterrent to Soviet aggression. I must say their arguments were not advanced with any great fervor and the others present were skeptical of the wisdom of doing what was suggested in this regard.

Bob pointed out that our controls over publicity are already so lax there is little of a secret nature to which the Russians have not already got access, and our new weapons, with the exception of those

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in the atomic field, are not of a nature that would necessarily deter the Soviet from action, especially since we have no reason to believe the Soviet armed forces will not be armed in an equally effective way.

At 4:30, we had a meeting at the White House attended by Dean, who had come in from the country for the purpose, Bob Lovett, Averell, Hank Byroade, John Ferguson and myself. The President decided he did not want to send a joint message from Mr. Churchill and himself to Mossadegh. He felt this might create the impression in Iran that the U. K. and the U. S. were ganging up against Iran and it would be more effective if messages were sent along parallel lines, each of them stating the principals had been in close touch with each other, and were in accord on what should be done. We talked over the text of a reply to Churchill, and, after some drafting when we returned to the office, delivered it to the British Ambassador for transmittal.

Ridge Knight came to dinner with me, and we sat up late. [redacted]

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